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INTRODUCTION
A record-setting number of individuals were exonerated and
released from prisons across the United States in 2015, bringing the
troubling reality of wrongful convictions to the forefront of public
discourse.1 Yet the issue of wrongful sentencing—the incarceration of
an individual for a longer period of time than she deserves based on
her offense of conviction and criminal history—remains mere
background noise in the discussion.2 Although wrongful conviction
has found greater traction in the media, wrongful sentencing works
similarly devastating impacts on prisoners’ lives.3 In both situations, a
1. One hundred twenty-five wrongfully convicted people were exonerated in 2014.
See, e.g., Mary Wisniewski, Exonerations of U.S. Criminals Hit Record in 2014: Study,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/us-usacrime-exonerations-idUSKBN0L00B620150127 [http://perma.cc/EVK5-6FAK] (discussing
the record-high number of exonerees in 2014 and its correlation to increased cooperation
among counsel for the wrongfully convicted, prosecutors, and law enforcement).
According to the University of Michigan Law School’s National Registry of Exonerations,
the number was even higher in 2015, with 149 individuals exonerated. 2015 Exonerations,
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages
/browse.aspx?View={B8342AE7-6520-4A32-8A06-4B326208BAF8}&FilterField1
=Exonerated&FilterValue1=8%5F2015 [http://perma.cc/7WLM-ERHS].
2. A proper federal sentence is based on the offense level of the defendant’s crime of
conviction, with appropriate adjustments for specific offense characteristics and the
defendant’s criminal history category. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
3. To follow along with the mechanics of the following example, see the Sentencing
Table in Appendix I. Take, for example, an individual who is convicted of a federal
kidnapping crime. Id. § 2A4.1. This individual’s base offense level under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines is thirty-two, id. § 2A4.1(a), and increases to thirty-four if he used a
firearm to commit the offense, id. § 2A4.1(b)(3). The individual’s sentencing range, based
solely on his crime of conviction, is 151 to 188 months. Id. at 404. If the defendant has two
prior aggravated assault convictions and, as a result, is sentenced as a career offender, the
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person is incarcerated for some period of time on the basis of a crime
he did not commit.
Despite the equivalent practical effect of wrongful conviction
and wrongful sentencing, the judicial system currently treats the two
situations differently based on a belief that they implicate “varying
degrees of injustice.”4 For instance, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of allowing a petitioner’s claim that she is
innocent of her crime of conviction to overcome judge-made
procedural bars to federal habeas corpus review (“conviction
innocence”).5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has concluded that a
petitioner presenting credible evidence that he is innocent of the
aggravating factors that elevated his sentence to death can receive
habeas review despite procedural bars to relief (“capital sentence
innocence”).6 But only a handful of circuit courts have recognized an
exception to procedural bars to habeas review for petitioners who
claim innocence of a prior conviction that served as a basis for
enhancing their noncapital sentence (“noncapital sentence
innocence”).7

guidelines mandate that his criminal history category is VI. Id. § 4B1.1 (stating that a
person will be sentenced as a career offender if (1) he was at least eighteen years of age at
the time he committed the crime of conviction, (2) the crime of conviction is either a
felony crime of violence or felony controlled substance offense, and (3) he has at least two
prior felony crime of violence or controlled substance convictions). In this example,
applying a criminal history category VI results in a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months.
Id. at 404. If the defendant is innocent of one of his prior convictions for aggravated
assault, then he has been improperly sentenced as a career offender and subjected to a
more severe sentence than he deserves. Had the sentence been properly calculated, with
only one prior aggravated assault conviction, the defendant would have had three prior
conviction points, id. § 4A1.1(a), resulting in a criminal history category of II and a
sentence of 168 to 210 months, id. at 404. As a result of the defendant’s improper
classification as a career offender, he was sentenced to a prison term of at least seven years
and ten months and up to nine years and nine months longer than he deserves.
4. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2014).
5. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (finding that a habeas
petitioner’s credible claim of conviction innocence could overcome the traditional
prohibition on successive petitions for habeas relief).
6. See generally Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (creating the capital sentence
exception to judge-made bars to relief).
7. For a complete discussion of this circuit split, see infra Section I.B. I use the
phrase “sentence innocence” to refer to the situation in which a petitioner claims
innocence of a prior conviction or aggravating sentencing factor and, therefore, innocence
of the enhanced sentence imposed by the trial court. As explained infra Section I.A,
sentence innocence breaks down into two subsets: (1) capital sentence innocence, in which
the petitioner claims innocence of the aggravating factors that resulted in imposition of the
death penalty; and (2) noncapital sentence innocence, in which the petitioner claims
innocence of one or more prior convictions that enhanced his noncapital sentence.
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Deepening the distinction between conviction and sentence
innocence, the Supreme Court recently held that a credible claim of
conviction innocence could overcome not only judge-made bars to
habeas review, but also statutory bars (“conviction innocence
exception”).8 In McQuiggin v. Perkins,9 the Supreme Court
recognized that a petitioner who presents convincing evidence of
conviction innocence could petition for habeas review even after the
one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions10 established by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)
expires.11 Yet, a prisoner with a convincing claim of noncapital
sentence innocence is powerless to overcome AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, no matter how egregious the sentencing error below.12
This Comment argues that treating innocence claims differently
depending on the type of innocence—conviction or sentence—at
issue creates a distinction without a difference. In each scenario, an
individual is punished more severely than warranted. Courts should
recognize the functional equivalence of these two situations and allow
both credible conviction and sentence innocence claims to trigger
exceptions to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
postconviction relief, the three innocence exceptions prior to
AEDPA, the changes wrought by AEDPA, and the contradictory
development of the noncapital sentence exception in various circuit
courts. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin v.
Perkins, which allows a credible conviction innocence claim to
overcome AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on habeas review.
Part III suggests that the underlying reasoning in McQuiggin, Fourth
Circuit precedent, and the fundamental similarities between wrongful

8. See generally McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). I use the phrase
“conviction innocence exception” to refer to the situation in which a petitioner claims to
be actually innocent of the crime that resulted in the conviction being challenged on
habeas review.
9. 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012) (imposing an identical statute of limitations on state
habeas petitions); § 2255(f) (imposing a statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions).
11. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932.
12. Petitioners have been uniformly unsuccessful in their attempts to convince federal
courts to recognize a sentence exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations analogous
to the conviction innocence exception established in McQuiggin. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014); Sims v. United States, No. 1:04–CR–0048–ODE–
JFK–1, 2014 WL 229335, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2014); Hall v. United States, No. 4:12–
02462–TLW, 2014 WL 130446, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2014); Ellerman v. Walton, 13–cv–
063–CJP, 2014 WL 103831, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2014); United States v. Robinson, No.
10–40037, 2013 WL 5874012, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2013).
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conviction and wrongful sentencing weigh in favor of allowing
credible noncapital sentence innocence claims to overcome
AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Part III also offers hypotheticals that
could persuade the Fourth Circuit to create just such an exception.13
Finally, Part IV addresses several counterarguments critics may make
against allowing a noncapital sentence exception to the statute of
limitations, concluding that the exception, where properly invoked,
should apply regardless of whether a bar to review is judge-made or
statutory.
I. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: EXPANSION, CONTRACTION, AND
THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
This Part sets forth a brief history of the judicial expansion of
habeas review and Congress’s responsive tightening of the writ
through AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. It also details the
creation and expansion of the conviction and sentence innocence
exceptions, which were established prior to AEDPA. The Part then
examines the existing circuit split over whether noncapital sentence
innocence should be the basis of an exception to judge-made, preAEDPA bars to habeas relief. This split has become even more
significant since the Court’s ruling in McQuiggin because it identifies
the most favorable forums for petitioners arguing that the McQuiggin
holding should apply to noncapital sentence innocence, as well as
conviction innocence. The Part concludes by explaining AEDPA’s
statute of limitations, which worked a major change in habeas
jurisprudence.
A. The Pre-AEDPA Actual Innocence Exception to Procedural Bars
Long before AEDPA, and in an effort to stem the rapid flow of
federal habeas petitions, the Supreme Court imposed various
procedural requirements on habeas petitioners that, if not met,

13. This Comment limits its scope to the Fourth Circuit for a number of reasons. First,
Fourth Circuit precedent provides a unique balance between the disavowal of the
noncapital sentence exception and liberal application of the exception, which mitigates
concerns over the administrability of expanding the exception to AEDPA’s statute of
limitations. See infra Section I.B.3. Further, the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United
States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2014), implicitly leaves the door open for future
defendants with a specific set of facts to successfully argue for the expansion of the
noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See infra Section III.B.
This confluence of circumstances renders the Fourth Circuit a prime candidate for
analysis.
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rendered courts unable to undertake habeas review.14 These judgemade, procedural bars prohibited habeas review in situations
including:
 Procedural default without cause: failing to adhere to a
state court’s procedural requirements due to no external
impediment and resulting in a failure to properly preserve the
issue at the state level;15
 Successive petitions: filing an additional habeas petition on
the same grounds set forth in a previous, rejected petition;16
and
 Abusive petitions: filing a habeas petition on the basis of an
argument or claim that could have been, but was not, raised at
an earlier stage of the litigation, such as at trial or before a
lower appellate court.17
The purpose of the successiveness and procedural default bars
was to ensure that federal court caseloads were not unreasonably
burdened by frivolous habeas claims.18 Yet, to ensure that prisoners
were not unjustly incarcerated simply because of their failure to
adhere to procedural rules, the Court established the “miscarriage of
justice exception[,]” which allowed the Court to hear procedurally
barred habeas claims upon the petitioner’s showing that “a
fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to
entertain the claim.”19
The stated purpose of the exception was to “serve[] as ‘an
additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an
unconstitutional loss of liberty.’ ”20 The Court originally intended this
exception to be a narrow one, applied only in “extraordinary
instances when a constitutional violation likely has caused the
conviction of one innocent of the crime.”21 The exception was framed
14. Kimberly A. Thomas, Substantive Habeas, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2014)
(noting that procedural requirements implemented by the Supreme Court “narrowed the
federal courthouse door to review of the merits of inmates’ claims”).
15. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 327.
16. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931.
17. Id. at 1931–32.
18. Thomas, supra note 14, at 1750.
19. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1995).
20. Id. at 495 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491–92 n.31 (1976)).
21. Id. at 494. The foundation of the conviction innocence exception is seen in various
cases. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (“[W]e think that in an
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in terms of “actual innocence.”22 Petitioners with a credible actual
innocence claim could overcome procedural bars to review despite
their inability to show cause for their default.23
Although the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that this
exception was a narrow one, it and other federal courts ultimately
expanded the exception beyond its original application to conviction
innocence and into the sentencing context, creating a sentence
exception first for capital sentences24 and later, in some circuits, for
noncapital sentences.25 In the sentencing realm, a prisoner’s actual
innocence does not mean that he is “innocent of the crime,” but
rather that he is “actually less guilty” than he was determined to be at
sentencing.26 The Supreme Court has affirmed the expansion of the
actual innocence exception only to the context of capital sentencing.
In Sawyer v. Whitley,27 the Court acknowledged that deeming a
person “innocent of death” is syntactically strange.28 Nonetheless, it
held that a petitioner may seek habeas review despite procedural bars
if she can provide proof that she is actually innocent of either: (1) the
elements of the underlying crime of conviction, again affirming the
conviction innocence exception; or (2) the aggravating factors that
resulted in the imposition of the death sentence, acknowledging for
the first time the capital sentence exception.29
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the
absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”). The exception has since been
expanded to various degrees by federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to apply to
the death penalty and, in some circuits, to noncapital sentences. See infra Section I.B.
22. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (holding that a petitioner
making a “colorable claim of factual innocence” can overcome the procedural bar on
second and successive petitions for habeas review, which are typically prohibited absent a
showing of cause or prejudice).
24. See generally Sawyer, 505 U.S. 333 (creating the capital sentence innocence
exception).
25. See generally, e.g., United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999)
(authorizing a noncapital sentence innocence exception).
26. Matthew Mattingly, Actually Less Guilty: The Extension of the Actual Innocence
Exception to the Sentencing Phase of Non-Capital Cases, 93 KY. L.J. 531, 536 (2004). While
it is syntactically strange to think of a person being actually innocent of his sentence, this is
exactly the terminology employed by courts. An actual innocence claim based on
innocence of the crime of conviction is termed “actual innocence of conviction,” while a
claim based on sentencing miscalculations or innocence of a prior crime taken into
account for sentencing purposes is dubbed “actual innocence of sentence.” For brevity I
refer to these categories as “conviction innocence” and “sentence innocence,”
respectively.
27. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
28. Id. at 341.
29. Id. at 346–47.
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Going a step further than the Supreme Court, some circuit courts
began to expand the sentence exception from capital cases to
noncapital cases, allowing sentencing errors in these cases to
overcome procedural bars to habeas review.30 The Supreme Court
was presented with the opportunity to decide whether the actual
innocence of noncapital sentence exception (“noncapital sentence
exception”) was proper in Dretke v. Haley31 but chose not to resolve
the circuit split. Rather than deciding the validity of the exception, the
Court directed lower courts to look for any alternative grounds for
granting postconviction relief before wading into the quagmires of
innocence claims and the various innocence-based exceptions.32 As a
result, a circuit split continues unabated over whether there should be
a noncapital sentence exception for procedural bars to habeas relief.33
B.

The Ongoing Circuit Split

Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dretke, the expansion of
the innocence exception from conviction innocence, to capital
sentence innocence, and finally to noncapital sentence innocence
remains subject to a circuit split.34 Although this split developed prior
to AEDPA, it remains relevant today because AEDPA codified the
originally judge-made bars, which have since been consistently
subjected to the same innocence-based exception scheme that
30. See, e.g., United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994). These two
branches of case law are distinguished by the terms “actual innocence of capital sentence”
and “actual innocence of noncapital sentence.” Id.
31. 541 U.S. 386, 393–94 (2004).
32. When declining the opportunity to resolve the existing circuit split over whether
to recognize an actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception, the Court stated:
We are asked in the present case to extend the actual innocence exception to
procedural default of constitutional claims challenging noncapital sentencing
error. We decline to answer the question in the posture of this case and instead
hold that a federal court faced with allegations of actual innocence, whether of the
sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for
comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default.
Id.
33. As will be discussed infra Part III, the possibility exists for this noncapital
sentence exception to be applied to statutory bars in some circumstances. Dretke does not
foreclose the prospect that the Court will recognize and apply the actual innocence of
noncapital sentence exception in the future; it merely demonstrates the Court’s
unwillingness to do so on Dretke’s facts.
34. The circuit split over the recognition and application of the noncapital sentence
exception to judge-made procedural bars is still relevant because AEDPA codified many
of these bars, making the jurisprudence addressed in this Section applicable to the
question of whether the now-statutory bars can be overridden by the various innocence
claims. See infra Section I.C.
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flourished prior to AEDPA.35 Thus, conflict over whether noncapital
sentence innocence triggers an exception to these now statutory
procedural bars to habeas review renders some jurisdictions more
desirable than others for litigants seeking to expand the noncapital
sentence exception to include AEDPA’s statute of limitations.36
Circuit courts tend to treat the noncapital sentence exception in
one of three ways. First, some circuits refuse to recognize the
exception, applying only the conviction and capital sentence
exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court.37 Second, other circuits
apply a relatively limitless noncapital sentence exception, imposing
few requirements on the types of petitioners and sentences that are
eligible.38 Third, some circuits recognize the noncapital sentence
exception but condition its application, for instance, by making it
available solely to prisoners sentenced as career offenders.39 Each
approach is addressed in turn.
1. No Recognition: The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has refused to recognize the noncapital
sentence exception. The court instead recognizes only the conviction
and capital sentence exceptions, which have express Supreme Court
approval.
In United States v. Richards,40 the Tenth Circuit firmly declined
to recognize the noncapital sentence exception.41 The petitioner,
incarcerated for 188 months on a federal drug offense,42 filed a second
§ 2255 motion (a petition for habeas review of a federal court’s
sentencing decision) for habeas relief after his first petition was

35. See, e.g., Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162,
170–71 (2d Cir. 2000).
36. See infra Section III.B.2.
37. The Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are representative of those courts that
do not recognize the actual innocence exception as it applies to noncapital sentences. See,
e.g., Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. United States,
640 F.3d 1293, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 (10th
Cir. 1993).
38. See, e.g., Spence, 219 F.3d at 170–71.
39. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits are among those courts that have taken this
approach. See, e.g., Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999).
40. 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
41. Id. at 1371.
42. The petitioner pled guilty to possession of one kilogram or more of a mixture
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine in powder form. Id. at 1370. The illegal drug was incorporated into a
wastewater mixture. Id.
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denied.43 This second petition was granted, and the petitioner’s
sentence was reduced from 188 months to 60 months.44 The State
appealed this reduction, claiming that the petition was successive and,
therefore, barred from the court’s consideration.45 On appeal before
the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that his original sentence was
improperly calculated because it was not “proportionate to his
culpability.”46 The defendant claimed that this improper sentence was
a miscarriage of justice and, thus, should render him eligible for
postconviction review despite the fact that his habeas petition was
barred as successive.47 In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit firmly stated
that only petitioners who are “actually innocent of the [convicted]
offense” are eligible for application of an innocence-based
exception.48
Since Richards, the Tenth Circuit has consistently echoed its
refusal to recognize the noncapital sentence exception.49 As a result, a
prisoner who files a procedurally defaulted habeas petition on the
basis of an error or miscalculation in her noncapital sentence finds an
unfriendly forum in the Tenth Circuit.50

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1371. The petitioner argued that his base offense level under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines was improperly calculated because it took into account the weight
of some of the wastewater mixture rather than the incorporated methamphetamine alone.
Id. at 1370.
47. Id. at 1370–71.
48. Id. at 1371 (“[The defendant] does not claim to be actually innocent of the offense
for which he was convicted; he claims only that he should have received a lesser sentence.
A person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence, however.”).
49. Despite its continued refusal to recognize the noncapital sentence exception
outright, in the court’s own words, its stance on the noncapital sentence exception is far
from “pellucid.” Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 545 n.6 (10th Cir. 2013). For an
example of the court’s willingness to recognize the noncapital sentence exception when a
petitioner is sentenced as a habitual offender but is factually innocent of one of the crimes
that form the basis of his classification as a habitual offender, see Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d
1029, 1036 (10th Cir. 1994). A retreat from the strong pronouncement that there can be no
noncapital sentence innocence would likely render the Tenth Circuit’s treatment of
noncapital sentence innocence claims quite similar to the Fourth Circuit’s, which is
addressed more fully below in Section I.B.3.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing
the petitioner’s actual innocence claim because the court’s precedent dictates that it is
impossible to be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence); Reid v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d
628, 630 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Further, we find nothing in the record to implicate the
‘miscarriage of justice’ exception, which requires a claim of actual innocence regarding the
offense under review.”).
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2. Liberal Application: The Second Circuit
In stark contrast to the Tenth Circuit, the Second Circuit has not
only recognized the noncapital sentence exception, but has also given
it broad application.51 This liberal construction is based on the court’s
interpretation of Sawyer, where the Supreme Court recognized the
capital sentence exception to procedural bars to habeas relief.52 The
court reads Sawyer’s holding as based not on some fundamental
difference between the death penalty and noncapital sentences, but
on “whether the constitutional error [that is the subject of the habeas
petition] ‘undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing
determination.’ ”53 The Second Circuit espouses the view that
“[b]ecause the harshness of the sentence does not affect the habeas
analysis and the ultimate issue, the justice of the incarceration, is the
same, there is no reason why the actual innocence exception should
not apply to noncapital sentencing procedures” just as it applies to the
death penalty.54 This reasoning prioritizes the principal purpose of all
habeas review cases—to correct unwarranted and unjustly imposed
sentences regardless of their degree of severity or permanence.55
The Second Circuit places few conditions on petitioners’ access
to the noncapital sentence exception. Borrego v. United States56 sets
forth the circuit’s three-prong test for determining whether the
exception may be invoked:
(1) The sentence imposed was the result of a violation of the
petitioner’s constitutional rights;
(2) the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence that
she is innocent of the facts on which her sentence was based;
and
(3) the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum permitted
under the applicable statute when the appropriate facts are
taken into consideration.57

51. See, e.g., Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162,
170–71 (2d Cir. 2000).
52. Id. at 171–72.
53. Id. at 170–71 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)).
54. Id. at 171.
55. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1995) (stating that the end goal of all habeas
review is “correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration”).
56. 975 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
57. Id. at 525.
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This standard does not require the petitioner to have been
sentenced under a particular sentencing scheme, such as the Armed
Career Criminal Act,58 or that the petitioner demonstrate factual, as
opposed to legal, innocence of a prior conviction that formed the
basis for the petitioner’s sentence.59 The Second Circuit does,
however, provide that only those petitioners whose imposed
sentences exceed the maximum period of incarceration for the range
in which they should have been classified can seek review through the
noncapital sentence exception.60
Although the Second Circuit’s liberal application of the
noncapital sentence exception offers broad access for habeas
petitioners, the relative dearth of conditions it imposes on the
exception’s application creates significant administrability concerns.61
The Second Circuit’s approach, though ideal from a fairness and
justice perspective, is thus less practicable and probably less
politically feasible than the Fourth Circuit’s more measured,

58. For example, in Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, the
Second Circuit applied the noncapital sentence exception in a case where the petitioner
was not sentenced as a habitual offender, but had his sentence enhanced from probation
to jail time after allegedly violating his plea agreement. Spence, 219 F.3d at 172. The
petitioner’s plea agreement included a provision that would revoke probation and trigger
imprisonment if he committed another, future criminal act. Id. at 169 (describing the plea
agreement as “a term of probation in exchange for a promise not to engage in misconduct
leading to an arrest”). When, after entering this agreement, the petitioner was arrested for
an armed robbery, his term of imprisonment was enhanced to between eight and one-third
to twenty-five years. Id. at 166. The petitioner was later acquitted of the armed robbery
that triggered his sentencing enhancement. Id. The Second Circuit allowed the petitioner
to take advantage of the noncapital sentence exception based on a basic conception of
innocence, rather than satisfaction of complicated requirements: “Where a sentencing
court relies on the commission of an act subsequent to trial or to a guilty plea as grounds
for raising the defendant’s sentence . . . , a petitioner may properly challenge the
conclusion that he committed the subsequent act on the ground that he was actually
innocent . . . .” Id. at 171–72. Although the quoted language is time-based in its focus on a
conviction that occurs after sentencing, other samples of the court’s language are quite
broad, indicating that prior convictions of which a defendant is actually innocent also
warrant application of the noncapital sentence exception. See id. at 172 (describing the
“quintessential miscarriage of justice” as “a person being punished for an act he did not
commit”).
59. As will be discussed infra Section I.B.3, these and other conditions are
prerequisites for application of the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception in
some circuits, and they may be advisable to deal with certain administrative implications
of recognizing the exception. See also infra Section III.B.2.
60. This condition helps reduce the administrative burden of actual innocence of
noncapital sentence claims. See infra Section III.B.2.
61. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between administrability in the
federal judicial branch and expansion of the noncapital sentence exception, see infra
Section IV.B.
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conditionally applied noncapital sentence exception, discussed in the
next Section.
3. Conditional Application: The Fourth Circuit
In a middle-of-the-road approach, the Fourth Circuit recognizes
the noncapital sentence exception but subjects it to certain
constraints. Much like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit bases its
recognition of the exception on the Supreme Court’s determination
that capital sentence innocence warrants special treatment in the
postconviction relief context.62 The Fourth Circuit reasons that,
“[e]xcept for the obvious difference in the severity of the sentences,
[there is] little difference between holding that a defendant can be
innocent of the acts required to enhance a sentence in a death case
and applying a parallel rationale in non-capital cases.”63 In capital
cases, the presence of aggravating factors can result in an enhanced
sentence: death. Similarly, in noncapital cases, the presence of certain
factors, namely prior convictions, can lead to a more severe—in other
words, longer—sentence.64 For the Fourth Circuit, the fundamental
similarity between sentencing errors in capital and noncapital cases—
a more severe sentence than warranted on the facts—compels the
court to provide a remedy for both types of error.
The Fourth Circuit first recognized the noncapital sentence
exception in United States v. Maybeck.65 In that case, the defendant
mistakenly characterized one of his prior burglary convictions as a
violent felony at sentencing, leading him to be inaccurately classified
as a career offender and improperly placed into a higher criminal
history category.66 This error resulted in an enhanced sentence.67 The
petitioner did not object to his improper classification as a career
offender at sentencing or on appeal, but later filed a § 2255 motion for
postconviction relief.68 This motion was denied as procedurally
defaulted without cause because the petitioner failed to exercise his
right to appeal the sentence or object to its improper basis below.69
62. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340–41 (1992).
63. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994).
64. See id.
65. 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994).
66. Id. at 890.
67. Id. at 890–91.
68. Id. at 891. A § 2255 motion refers to the petition for habeas relief brought by a
federal prisoner, and a § 2244 motion is the analogue for a state prisoner. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244, 2255 (2012).
69. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891 (finding that the defendant’s failure to raise his improper
classification as a career offender and resulting placement in a higher criminal history
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of the noncapital
sentence exception, finding that the petitioner’s prior burglary
conviction did not qualify as a violent felony, that he was improperly
sentenced as a career offender, and that he was, therefore, innocent
of his noncapital sentence.70 This conclusion allowed the petitioner to
have his § 2255 motion heard despite its untimeliness and procedural
default.
The Fourth Circuit later cabined its adoption of the noncapital
sentence exception in two ways. In United States v. Mikalajunas,71 the
court restricted application of the exception to instances where a
defendant’s sentence is improperly based on his wrongful
classification as a habitual or career offender.72 After this case, a
petitioner with a procedurally defaulted claim who argues for
application of the noncapital sentence exception must allege that she
is innocent of one of the underlying crimes that served as the
predicate for her classification specifically as a habitual or career
offender.73 Sentencing enhancement schemes other than habitual
offender provisions do not trigger the noncapital sentence
exception.74
Second, the Fourth Circuit began requiring a showing of factual
innocence in noncapital sentence innocence claims. Factual innocence
requires the petitioner to show that he actually did not commit one or
more of the crimes on which his sentence was predicated, not merely
that a procedural or constitutional defect at trial resulted in a legally
wrongful conviction.75 Similarly, petitioners seeking habeas review to
category as an objection at the sentencing hearing was a procedural default barring a
motion for habeas review). Procedural defaults come in a variety of shapes and sizes,
including “successive” petitions based on arguments previously rejected, “abusive”
petitions based on claims that could have been, but were not, raised in an initial petition,
and a general failure to observe rules, such as filing deadlines. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133
S. Ct. 1924, 1931–32 (2013) (citations omitted).
70. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 892, 894. In more familiar language, the petitioner was in fact
“less guilty” than his original, disproportionate, and, ultimately, unjust sentence.
71. 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999).
72. See id. at 494–95. For a discussion of the types of sentencing schemes that fall
under the general heading of “habitual or career offender” provisions, see infra Section
III.B.1.
73. See Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 495.
74. For instance, in Mikalajunas, the court held that the two petitioners were
ineligible for the noncapital sentence exception when they sought habeas review of their
sentences under the theory that they had not restrained the victim and, therefore, should
not have been subject to the corresponding sentencing enhancement. Id. at 492. This
aggravating factor claim is not based on innocence of a prior conviction.
75. Id. at 494 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–41 (1992)) (“[A] petitioner
must demonstrate actual factual innocence of the offense of conviction, i.e., that petitioner
did not commit the crime of which he was convicted; this standard is not satisfied by a
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appeal a question of statutory interpretation cannot use the
noncapital sentence exception to achieve review of procedurally
defaulted claims.76 Mikalajunas also established an evidentiary
standard, requiring a petitioner to present clear and convincing
evidence of factual innocence of a prior conviction before the
noncapital sentence exception can apply.77 The conditions imposed on
the noncapital sentence exception in the Fourth Circuit make it a
prime jurisdiction for the creation of an administrable exception to
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.78 While these conditions do close the
court’s doors to some unjustly sentenced petitioners, the same
conditions provide strong counterarguments to opponents’ assertions
that expanding the noncapital sentence exception would be hugely
unadministrable, undermine the finality of judicial decisions, and
result in an untenable flood of litigation in federal district courts,
making an expansion more palatable to opponents.
As this Section demonstrates, recognition and application of the
noncapital sentence exception varies among the circuit courts. Those
jurisdictions that have taken the initial step of recognizing the
noncapital sentence exception are those most likely to expand the
exception outside its current context of procedural bars and into new
statutory bars, such as AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Those courts
that have stringently limited or refused to acknowledge the exception
are unlikely to be attractive forums for expansion.
C.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Congress
Reins in the Courts’ Broad Interpretation of Habeas Review

By 1991, the judiciary had expanded habeas corpus jurisprudence
significantly, allowing federal courts to hear “all dispositive
constitutional claims” that were properly presented and unmarred by
unexcused procedural errors.79 The innocence exceptions, which
showing that a petitioner is legally, but not factually, innocent.”); see also United States v.
Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 894) (“[A]ctual
innocence applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge
to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal
classification of the predicate crimes.”).
76. See, e.g., Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284 (holding that a petitioner seeking to overcome
procedural bars to review through the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception
was ineligible for the exception because the basis of his appeal was whether one of his
prior convictions ought to be interpreted as a violent felony, not presentation of evidence
tending to show that he was in fact innocent of the previously convicted crime).
77. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493.
78. See infra Section III.B.2.
79. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991); see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S.
386, 388 (2004) (“Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of
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allowed courts to hear procedurally barred claims where the
petitioner presented a credible claim of conviction or capital sentence
innocence (and, in some circuits, even noncapital sentence
innocence), were some of the primary tools courts used to expand the
writ.80
In response to expansive judicial interpretation of the right to
habeas review, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.81 AEDPA’s habeas reforms were largely
aimed at imposing limitations on what Congress believed was a
widely abused writ.82 AEDPA reformed the judiciary’s habeas
practices in a number of ways,83 including by formally codifying judgemade procedural bars, such as the prohibition on successive
petitions.84 The codification of these formerly judge-made procedural
bars simultaneously incorporated the jurisprudence surrounding the
various innocence-based exceptions, rendering the circuit split over
whether to recognize the noncapital sentence exception relevant even
after AEDPA.85 The difference is that the circuit split now centers on
justice, a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a
petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the
default.”).
80. See supra Section I.A.
81. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
82. For example, see Anthony Roby, Taking a Heavy Toll: The Constitutional
Implications of Prohibiting Equitable Tolling in Cases of Actual Innocence, 89 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 81, 83 (2011) (“The passage of AEDPA marked Congress’s most recent
effort to ‘curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus . . . .’ ” (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 944)).
83. For example, AEDPA amends Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure to dictate that habeas petitions must be heard first in the appropriate federal
district court and amends 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to require exhaustion of state remedies before
appeal to the federal courts. §§ 103, 104, 110 Stat. at 1218. Because the focus of this
Comment is on expanding the applicability of the actual innocence exception to include
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, only the creation of the one-year statute of limitations
will be addressed here.
84. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (barring second or successive petitions
for habeas review).
85. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013) (stating that “[t]he miscarriage
of justice exception . . . survived AEDPA’s passage”). The phrase “miscarriage of justice
exception” is another way federal courts have referred to the concept behind the
innocence-based exceptions to procedurally defaulted habeas review: that it is a manifest
injustice to allow an innocent person to be wrongfully incarcerated for any period of time.
See, e.g., id. at 1935 (finding a “miscarriage of justice” when “no reasonable juror would
have convicted” the petitioner of his crime of conviction); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
320–21 (1995) (explaining that the goal behind all habeas review is to avoid wrongful
incarceration of innocent individuals); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr.
Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2000) (equating a “miscarriage of justice” with a
sentence improperly based on a wrongful act the defendant did not commit).
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whether the exception can circumvent statutory bars to review rather
than judge-made bars.
AEDPA’s most notable change to the habeas regime was its
implementation of a one-year statute of limitations on all petitions for
review.86 Although judge-made procedural bars did exist,87 AEDPA
was Congress’s first foray into establishing a formal statute of
limitations period for habeas petitions.88 This one-year statute of
limitations applies to both state and federal prisoners’ petitions for
habeas review.89 For federal prisoners,90 the one-year statute-oflimitations period begins to run on the date on which the latest of the
following events occurs:
(1) [T]he date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was
prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or

86. §§ 101, 105, 110 Stat. at 1217, 1220. State prisoners apply for habeas review using
28 U.S.C. § 2244, while federal prisoners make their petitions through 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The one-year statute of limitations provision is largely the same in both statutory sections.
Compare § 2244(d)(1), with § 2255(f).
87. See supra Section I.A.
88. Roby, supra note 82, at 83–84 (“Prior to 1996, there was no formal statute of
limitations applicable in habeas proceedings; however, ‘state law often imposed timeliness
requirements.’ ” (quoting Lisker v. Knowles, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1034 (C.D. Cal.
2006))).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations for state
prisoners); see also § 2255(f) (mandating a one-year statute of limitations period for
federal prisoners).
90. Because the focal point of this Comment is the Fourth Circuit and its decision not
to extend the actual innocence exception to the federal prisoner in Jones, the federal
statute of limitations in § 2255 is most relevant and will serve as the basis for analysis.
However, the state statute of limitations provisions in § 2244 are virtually identical in
meaning, although some wording of the provision does differ. Compare § 2244(d)(1), with
§ 2255(f).
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(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.91
In the wake of AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the question
arose whether innocence could serve as an exception to the firm time
bar, just as it served as an exception to various procedural bars before
AEDPA and to those same bars codified by AEDPA.
II. OVERCOMING STATUTORY BARS TO HABEAS REVIEW:
MCQUIGGIN V. PERKINS
While the three innocence-based exceptions traditionally
overcame only judge-made bars to habeas review, courts continued to
apply the exceptions even after AEDPA formally codified the
procedural bars.92 Although AEDPA’s statutory language does not
expressly adopt an innocence-based exception, courts continue to see
innocence differently, allowing certain types of innocence claims to
overcome AEDPA’s statutory bars to postconviction relief 93 based on
a fundamental concern that innocent persons not be wrongfully
incarcerated.94 The Supreme Court, for example, has recognized the
91. § 2255(f).
92. See, e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004) (stating, eight years after
AEDPA, that actual innocence is a “narrow exception to the general rule” that federal
habeas courts will not hear procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner can show
cause for and prejudice resulting from the default).
93. Compare United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2012)
(refusing to recognize a noncapital sentence exception to untimely filed habeas petitions
post-AEDPA), with Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d
162, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2000) (extending the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s
statutory bar against federal court review of procedurally defaulted habeas petitions in
which the petitioner failed to adhere to state procedural rules).
94. This concern has been the backdrop behind the actual innocence exception to
judge-made procedural bars; the creation and application of the exception reflects the
reality that, although the writ of habeas corpus is focused on correcting procedural defects
in criminal trials, substantive innocence is a fundamental consideration in habeas review.
See The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Leading Cases, 127 HARV. L. REV. 318, 318 (2013).
Despite courts’ continued concern for substantive innocence, petitioners attempting to
enter the actual innocence “gateway” must present evidence supporting not only a
colorable claim of actual innocence, but also the presence of a procedural defect in their
trial. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); see also Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (“ ‘[A]ctual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but
instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”). Meeting the procedural default
requirement is likely relatively easy for actually innocent petitioners. Jordan M. Barry,
Prosecuting the Exonerated: Actual Innocence and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 535, 552 n.161 (2012) (“A petitioner who demonstrates that she is actually
innocent is likely to have an easier time demonstrating that she was damaged by any legal
infirmities that plagued her proceedings.”).
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continued application of the conviction innocence and capital
sentence exceptions to AEDPA’s successiveness prohibition despite
the fact that it is now a statutory, rather than judge-made, bar.95 In
McQuiggin v. Perkins, the Supreme Court, for the first time, allowed
an innocence claim to overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations. This
Part discusses McQuiggin’s facts and reasoning as background for
Part III, which argues that the McQuiggin Court’s rationale, among
other factors, should apply to the noncapital sentence exception as
well as the conviction innocence exception.96
McQuiggin marked the first time the Supreme Court applied the
judge-made conviction innocence exception to a congressionally
established statute of limitations.97 The Court’s extension of the
exception was based in large part on pre-AEDPA innocence
jurisprudence and the understanding that, though of great
importance, “the societal interests in finality, comity, and
conservation of scarce judicial resources” must be weighed against the
strong “individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary
[innocence] case.”98 In McQuiggin, the Court decided that the need to
rectify the incarceration of innocent persons was strong enough to
overcome even AEDPA’s statute of limitations.99
The petitioner in McQuiggin, Floyd Perkins, was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.100 Eleven years later, Perkins filed a habeas
petition alleging both ineffective assistance of counsel and newly
discovered evidence proving his innocence.101 This filing undisputedly
occurred after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired.102
Although the Supreme Court had previously recognized that
petitioners who diligently pursue their rights but face extraordinary
obstacles to filing a habeas petition might equitably toll the statute of

95. See, e.g., Dretke, 541 U.S. at 388 (“We have recognized a narrow exception to the
general rule when the habeas applicant can demonstrate that the alleged constitutional
error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the underlying
offense or, in the capital sentencing context, of the aggravating circumstances rendering
the inmate eligible for the death penalty.”).
96. See infra Section III.B.2.
97. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1932 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)).
99. Id. (“Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual should not
abate when the impediment is AEDPA’s statute of limitations.”).
100. Id. at 1929.
101. Id.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
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limitations,103 Perkins was not eligible for tolling because he was not
diligent in pursuing his claim.104 Given the unavailability of tolling, the
Court considered whether Perkins’s conviction innocence claim
allowed him to bypass the statute of limitations altogether.105 Citing
the traditionally accepted application of the conviction innocence
exception to judge-made procedural bars,106 the Court held that
credible claims of conviction innocence also trigger an exception to
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.107
McQuiggin’s holding is, of course, grounded in the facts of the
case: Perkins claimed conviction innocence, not noncapital sentence
innocence.108 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that its expansion
of the conviction innocence exception was not intended to open the
floodgates of litigation and allow every petitioner claiming conviction
innocence to do so well after the statute of limitations expires.109 Yet,
this Comment argues that the fundamental similarity between
incarcerating an individual for a crime of conviction he did not
commit and imprisoning a person for a longer period of time based on
a previous crime that he did not commit requires that the two
scenarios be treated alike.110 This approach would permit a wrongfully
incarcerated person to seek habeas review beyond the statute of
limitations when there is convincing evidence that she is innocent of a
prior conviction on which her sentence was based.111

103. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2004)) (stating that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations “if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing”).
104. The three affidavits that Perkins sought to classify as new evidence of his actual
innocence of the murder conviction had been in his possession since 1997, 1999, and 2002.
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1929–30. Perkins did not petition for habeas review until 2008—
almost six years after he obtained the last affidavit tending to prove his innocence—which
the Court found to demonstrate a lack of diligence. Id. at 1929, 1931.
105. Id. at 1931 (“[Perkins] thus seeks an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1), not an
extension of the time statutorily prescribed.”).
106. Id. at 1931–32.
107. Id. at 1933–34. The Court emphasized that its holding was supported by
precedent. Id. at 1934 (“Our reading of the statute is supported by the Court’s opinion in
Holland. ‘[E]quitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas
corpus . . . [and] we will not construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional equitable
authority absent the clearest command.’ ” (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 646)).
108. Id. at 1929.
109. Id. at 1936 (“The gateway should open only when a petition presents ‘evidence of
innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial . . . .’ ”)
(quoting Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)).
110. See infra Part III.
111. See infra Section III.B.
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III. EXPANDING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S ACTUAL INNOCENCE OF
NONCAPITAL SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO AEDPA’S STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
The McQuiggin Court’s foray into applying the judge-made
conviction innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations
was a significant step forward in minimizing obstacles to
postconviction relief. Yet this case does not provide any relief for
petitioners bringing untimely habeas claims based on a sentenceinnocence theory. This disparate treatment based on the type of
innocence at issue (conviction versus sentence) fails to acknowledge
the basic commonality between the two: in both instances, an
improperly sentenced individual remains incarcerated for a longer
period of time than warranted based on his crime of conviction and
criminal history.
Petitioners arguing for equal treatment of these two types of
innocence may find a receptive court in the Fourth Circuit. The
Fourth Circuit’s conditional recognition of the noncapital sentence
exception, along with the Supreme Court’s rationale in McQuiggin,
present a confluence of elements that render the court ripe for
petitioners to argue that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be
subject to the noncapital sentence exception.112 The Fourth Circuit
does not provide the same broad opportunity for expanding the
noncapital sentence exception as the Second Circuit’s liberal
innocence jurisprudence, but its limits would mitigate concerns over
expanding the exception, such as the resulting impact on judicial
efficiency and docket load.113
This Part addresses the failed attempt to expand the noncapital
sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the Fourth
Circuit and the remaining opportunity to expand the exception given
better facts. It then argues that the Fourth Circuit should—based on
its own precedent and in the interest of justice—allow the noncapital
sentence exception to overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
A. Jones: A Compelling Argument Doomed by Inapposite Facts
In United States v. Jones,114 the petitioner argued for an extension
of the Fourth Circuit’s noncapital sentence exception that would
allow him to bypass AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, there were facial
112. See infra Section III.B.2.a.
113. See supra Section I.B.2; infra Section IV.B.
114. 758 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2014).
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distinctions between Jones’s facts and those presented in prior cases
where the Fourth Circuit invoked the noncapital sentence
exception.115 Second, prior Fourth Circuit cases allowed the judgemade exception to overcome a judge-made bar, but did not address
the potential for innocence to trump a statutory bar.116 Although
some portions of the Jones opinion reject a noncapital sentence
exception to the statute of limitations in very broad terms,117 the
decision does not entirely foreclose the opportunity to expand the
exception’s scope.118
1. The Facts
Petitioner Torrance Jones was convicted of a nonviolent drug
offense in federal court119 and sentenced to thirty years (360 months)
in prison.120 Jones’s sentence was calculated under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and took into account his criminal history,
which included two prior convictions under Florida law.121 Jones
received the minimum sentence within the permissible range for his
offense level and criminal history category.122
After Jones received his federal sentence, the Florida state court
vacated his two prior convictions.123 His 2004 conviction for

115. See infra Section III.A.2.
116. See infra Section III.A.2.
117. The majority opinion states, “At bottom, we conclude that McQuiggin does not
extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual innocence of his sentence, rather than of
his crime of conviction[,]” seemingly prohibiting future petitioners from attempting to rely
on this Supreme Court case as a means of extending the actual innocence of noncapital
sentence exception to statutory bars to review. Jones, 758 F.3d at 586. However, as will be
addressed infra Section III.A.3, a number of elements suggest that McQuiggin or other
cases could still form the basis of just such an expansion.
118. See infra Section III.A.3.
119. Jones was convicted of trafficking seventy-nine kilograms of cocaine and twentysix kilograms of cocaine base. The court also found that Jones played a managerial role in
the crime, which is an aggravating factor at sentencing. Jones, 758 F.3d at 581.
120. Id. at 580.
121. Id. at 580–81. Jones’s convictions were for: (1) possession of marijuana; and (2)
possession of a concealed firearm, loitering or prowling, and possession of burglary tools.
Id. at 581. This sentence was appealed and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in 1998. United
States v. Jones, Nos. 97-4083, 97-4084, 97-4107, 1998 WL 761542, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 2,
1998).
122. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones at 3, United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d
579 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-7675). Jones’s conviction required an offense level of forty, and
he was designated as a criminal history category III. The criminal history category was
determined by assigning points both for Jones’s two prior state court convictions and for
the fact that the federal conviction at issue occurred within two years of those prior
convictions, totaling six points. Id.
123. Id. at 4.
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possession of marijuana was vacated on constitutional grounds,124
while his 2008 conviction for possession of a concealed firearm was
vacated on the basis of his factual innocence.125 Had one or both of
these vacated convictions been excluded from Jones’s criminal history
calculation at sentencing, Jones would have fallen into a lower
criminal history category (category I or II, depending on which
vacated convictions were excluded).126 If both of Jones’s vacated prior
convictions had been excluded, he would have been classified as a
criminal history category I and sentenced to 292 to 405 months.127 If
only one of Jones’s vacated prior convictions had been excluded, he
would have fallen into criminal history category II and been
sentenced to anywhere between 324 and 405 months.128 While the
360-month sentence ultimately imposed did fall within both of these
lower guideline ranges, had the prior convictions been excluded from
the calculation, the court could have, in its discretion, sentenced Jones
to fewer than 360 months in prison.129
Relying on the vacatur of these prior convictions, Jones filed a
§ 2255 petition for habeas review in 2009, less than one year after his
second state conviction was vacated and, thus, within AEDPA’s
statute of limitations.130 But, because Jones had filed a § 2255 petition
in 2000 (before his state convictions were vacated),131 his 2009 petition
was denied as successive.132 Jones filed yet another § 2255 motion for
habeas review in 2012, several years after the state convictions were

124. Id. at 4–5. The conviction was vacated because of violations of the Fourth and
Sixth Amendments that occurred incident to Jones’s arrest and trial. This is often
considered a vacatur on the grounds of legal innocence, as opposed to factual innocence.
125. Id. An affidavit stating that Jones had committed no crime on which this
conviction could be based was submitted to the court and formed the basis of this vacatur.
As opposed to the Fourth and Sixth Amendment violations on which his first vacatur was
based, this proceeding was founded on the fact that Jones did not in fact commit the crime
for which he was convicted.
126. Id. at 3–4.
127. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 404 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
128. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4.
129. To follow along with these technical facts, please consult Appendix I, which
includes a copy of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table.
130. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 6–7. This was
Jones’s second § 2255 motion. The first was filed after Jones’s sentence was imposed, but
before he obtained the vacaturs of his two Florida convictions. United States v. Jones, 758
F.3d 579, 580 (4th Cir. 2014).
131. This petition was filed in 2000 and based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Jones, 758 F.3d at 580.
132. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 5.

94 N.C. L. REV. 991 (2016)

1014

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

vacated.133 In this motion, he argued that his 2009 § 2255 motion was
improperly denied as successive because his state convictions had not
been vacated at the time of his initial motion in 2000.134 Jones’s 2012
petition was dismissed as untimely because it was filed after
AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired.135 Jones was, however,
granted a certificate of appealability for this denial because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin.136 On appeal, Jones claimed
that the vacatur of his prior state convictions rendered him innocent
of his 360-month sentence.137 Jones argued for the noncapital
sentence exception to be extended to AEDPA’s statute of limitations
based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McQuiggin.138
2. The Majority Opinion: Focused on Facial Distinctions
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Jones’s argument, neatly
cabining McQuiggin’s application to only those instances in which a
petitioner “demonstrates actual innocence of his crime of
conviction.”139 This broad language precludes future defendants from
attempting to use McQuiggin alone as a basis for expanding the
noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.140
However, the factual distinctions between Jones’s case and other
cases in which the Fourth Circuit has applied the noncapital sentence
exception indicate that, given more congruent facts, the court may be
willing to create an exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations
based on noncapital sentence innocence.141
The majority’s decision to reject Jones’s argument for expanding
the noncapital sentence exception rested largely on facial distinctions
between Jones’s case, McQuiggin, and Fourth Circuit precedent. The
first basis for the majority’s refusal to apply McQuiggin in Jones’s

133. This 2012 § 2255 petition is the central petition in the 2014 Fourth Circuit opinion.
Id. at 5–6.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. The 2012 § 2255 petition was filed four years after the latest vacatur of Jones’s
two state convictions, which occurred in 2008, and eight years after the first vacatur, which
occurred in 2004. The court found that Jones had not filed the petition within one year of
his having notice that the convictions had been vacated and, therefore, his petition fell
outside AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Jones, 758 F.3d at 582.
136. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 6.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. Jones, 758 F.3d at 581.
140. See id. at 586.
141. See id. at 587 (King, J., concurring).
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case was the distinction between the types of innocence at issue.142
While the petitioner in McQuiggin claimed conviction innocence,
Jones claimed only noncapital sentence innocence.143 The majority
relied on language from McQuiggin to justify its refusal to extend that
case’s reasoning beyond conviction innocence. In McQuiggin, Justice
Ginsburg had justified the conviction innocence exception’s
expansion by insisting that it would not result in a watershed of
untimely and traditionally unreviewable habeas petitions, writing,
“[t]he miscarriage of justice exception . . . applies to a severely
confined category: cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the
petitioner].’ ”144 According to the Jones majority, this language
suggests that McQuiggin applies only to conviction innocence
claims.145
The Jones majority also presumed that its disparate treatment of
these two types of innocence—that of conviction versus that of
noncapital sentence—was justified because the two give rise to
“varying degrees of injustice.”146 While “[i]nnocence of conviction
implicates the notion that a person has been incarcerated for a crime
he did not commit . . . a sentencing error does not at all implicate
guilt.”147 Based on this belief in “varying degrees of injustice[,]”148 a
Fourth Circuit petitioner who is entirely innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted can use McQuiggin to seek habeas review
after the statute of limitations expires; yet, a person who is innocent
of one of the prior convictions that serves as the basis for his
enhanced sentence cannot use the same exception to achieve review
of his improperly calculated and, thus, unjustly imposed sentence.

142. Id. at 583 (majority opinion) (“[Jones] asks us to apply a rule providing for relief
based on actual innocence of a crime of conviction to a situation where he is actually
innocent of a federal sentence.”).
143. See id.
144. Id. at 584 (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013)).
145. As will be discussed infra Section III.B.2.c, this particular line of reasoning from
McQuiggin’s discussion of actual innocence of conviction could reasonably be applied in
actual innocence of noncapital sentence claims. For instance, if no reasonable juror could
have convicted the petitioner of one of her prior convictions because of convincing
evidence that she was factually innocent of the crime, and her instant sentence was based
in part of this wrongful prior conviction, it would seem that the exception should apply to
overcome the statute of limitations just as it does in McQuiggin. Either way, applying the
McQuiggin exception would allow the court to remedy the unjust incarceration of an
individual for a crime that she did not commit.
146. Jones, 758 F.3d at 584–85.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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As further justification for this disparate treatment, the court
focused on the conflict between Jones’s proposed application of the
noncapital sentence exception and the Fourth Circuit’s historical
application of the same. While the court acknowledged Fourth Circuit
precedent recognizing and applying the noncapital sentence
exception, it distinguished those cases from Jones by pointing out that
prior cases used the exception to overcome judge-made bars to
review, while Jones sought to use the exception to overcome a
statutory bar.149 The majority did not address the other Fourth Circuit
preconditions for applying the noncapital sentence exception.150
The Jones opinion used these facial distinctions between
conviction and noncapital sentence innocence, as well as between
judge-made and statutory bars, to conclude that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations could not be overridden absent a claim of conviction
innocence. While these facial distinctions certainly exist and provide a
sound basis for the Jones decision, this Comment argues that the
fundamental similarities between conviction and noncapital sentence
innocence claims justify their similar treatment.151 The two claims
implicate the very same injustice—not “varying degrees” of it.
3. The Jones Concurrence: The Majority’s Missed Opportunity for
Reform
Judge King’s brief but significant concurrence in Jones suggests
that there may still be an opportunity for Fourth Circuit petitioners to
expand the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of
limitations. In particular, the concurrence suggests that Fourth Circuit
precedent recognizing and applying the noncapital sentence exception
could serve as an independent basis for expanding the exception.152
The concurrence limited its reasoning to distinguishing between
Jones’s facts and other cases in which the Fourth Circuit has applied
the noncapital sentence exception.153 Specifically, the court has
traditionally limited the application of the noncapital sentence
exception to those cases in which the petitioner was sentenced under
a habitual or career offender provision.154 According to the
149. Id. at 586–87 (“Jones does discuss at length three Fourth Circuit cases addressing
an actual innocence of sentence exception. But, in each case, the exception was raised not
in the context of a statute of limitations, but rather in the context of a judge-made
procedural default rule.”).
150. For discussion of these preconditions, see infra Section III.A.3.
151. See infra Section III.B.2.
152. See infra Section III.B.2.
153. See infra Section III.B.
154. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 1999).
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concurrence, Jones was not sentenced under such a provision; his
prior convictions were simply taken into account when his sentence
was calculated.155 Based on this distinction, Judge King found that the
noncapital sentence exception was not available in Jones’s case,
leaving “for another day—and a more appropriate case—the question
of whether AEDPA’s time limitations foreclose a late-filed claim
alleging actual innocence of a noncapital (or capital) sentence.”156 The
concurrence’s more limited reasoning is preferable to the majority’s
broad holding, which seems to foreclose expansion of the noncapital
sentence exception not only through McQuiggin, but also through any
other line of reasoning. This foreclosure was premature and based on
a flawed conception of the injustices wrought by incarcerating an
“entirely innocent” person as opposed to a “partially guilty and
partially innocent” person.
B.

Moving Forward After Jones: Expanding the Noncapital Sentence
Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

Despite the Jones opinion’s broad language,157 the opportunity to
expand the noncapital sentence exception continues to exist in the
Fourth Circuit, albeit not through McQuiggin alone. The differences
between Jones’s case and the facts presented by petitioners who have
invoked the noncapital sentence exception in prior Fourth Circuit
cases make Jones a poor case for expanding the exception. But these
differences do not altogether foreclose the opportunity. The court
could use its own precedent, its traditional equitable power to invoke
the exception, and principles of justice and fairness as bases for
expanding the exception. By focusing on the incongruences of Jones’s
facts, it is possible to hypothesize about what facts future petitioners
would need to allege for the Fourth Circuit to expand the noncapital
sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

155. See United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 587 (2014) (King, J., concurring) (“[S]uch
exception cannot help Jones because he was not sentenced as a habitual offender.”); see
also id. at 580 (majority opinion) (“[Jones’s] sentence was enhanced by, among other
things, two prior Florida state court convictions.”).
156. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring).
157. Specifically, the majority stated that McQuiggin will not be applied in actual
innocence of noncapital sentence cases, but will be invoked only when petitioners claim
actual innocence of their crime of conviction. Id. at 586 (majority opinion) (“At bottom,
we conclude that McQuiggin does not extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual
innocence of his sentence, rather than of his crime of conviction.”).
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1. Necessary Facts
The outcome in Jones suggests two distinct facts that future
petitioners must present to persuade the Fourth Circuit to expand the
noncapital innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations:
(1) sentencing pursuant to a habitual or career offender provision;
and (2) a claim of factual, as opposed to legal, innocence.
First, a court must have sentenced the petitioner as a “habitual
offender.”158 This term is rife with ambiguities. There is no expressly
named “habitual offender statute,” although numerous statutory
schemes include a defendant’s criminal history as part of the
sentencing calculation. For instance, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
require federal judges to include a defendant’s criminal history in
determining the range of available sentences.159 Similarly, calculating
a defendant’s sentence under North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing
scheme involves totaling the defendant’s “points” based on prior
convictions to determine his prior record level. This level, along with
the offense class for the crime of conviction, controls the available
sentencing range.160
Other sentencing mechanisms emphasize the defendant’s prior
convictions beyond simply including them as an element of the
sentencing scheme. By exclusion, it is clear that these are the
statutory schemes that the Fourth Circuit speaks of when referencing
habitual and career offender sentencing provisions.161 One of these
schemes is the federal career offender enhancement. A defendant
may be treated as a career offender based on his prior commission
and conviction of certain offenses when certain factors are present.162
If deemed a career offender, the defendant is subjected to a

158. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring).
159. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (US. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015).
160. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, N.C. STRUCTURED
SENTENCING TRAINING & REFERENCE MANUAL 4 fig. A, 6–10 (N.C. SENTENCING &
POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N 2009).
161. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 580, 587 (4th Cir. 2014) (King, J., concurring)
(distinguishing the sentencing scheme used to sentence Jones, which merely took prior
conviction into account, from true “habitual offender provisions”).
162. These factors are: (1) the convicted person must be eighteen or older at the time
of the instant offense; (2) the instant conviction must be a felony crime of violence or
felony controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant must have at least two prior
convictions for felony crime of violence or controlled substance offenses. OFFICE OF GEN.
COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIMER 7 (2013); see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1.
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significantly enhanced sentence.163 The Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”)164 also provides for an enhanced sentence based on prior
convictions and the convicted person’s presumed undeterrability from
a life of crime.165
Merely being sentenced under a statutory scheme that takes
prior convictions into account is insufficient to invoke the noncapital
sentence exception in the Fourth Circuit. This is one of the primary
differences between Jones’s facts and those in prior cases where the
exception has been invoked. Jones was not treated as a career
offender or sentenced under the ACCA; rather, his prior state
convictions were simply taken into account to calculate his
appropriate sentencing range.166 The concurrence emphasizes this
difference as one basis for declining to expand the exception in
Jones.167
Second, a petitioner attempting to expand the noncapital
sentence exception must ground her claim in factual innocence of a
prior conviction, which involves evidence showing that the petitioner
did not in fact commit the crime, as opposed to legal innocence, which
is based on a constitutional or procedural error at trial.168 This is
consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Mikalajunas, which
restricts the noncapital sentence exception to those instances in which
the petitioner presents a claim of factual innocence and prohibits its
use when the petitioner asserts mere legal innocence.169 This is yet
another distinction between Jones’s facts and those presented by
previous petitioners who successfully invoked the noncapital sentence
exception. While one of Jones’s prior convictions was vacated due to
factual innocence, the other vacatur was granted due to constitutional
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. In addition to mandating an
enhanced sentencing range, a defendant sentenced as a career offender must be
considered as having a criminal history category of VI, regardless of what category would
be appropriate absent treatment as a career offender. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 162, at 8.
164. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984).
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). The ACCA applies when a defendant has been
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, § 922(g), and also has three prior
convictions for any “violent felony or . . . serious drug offense[.]” § 924(e)(1). The ACCA
mandates that eligible defendants be sentenced to at least fifteen years in prison due to
their continued commitment to breaking the law. Id.
166. See Jones, 758 F.3d at 580.
167. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring).
168. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A]
petitioner must demonstrate actual factual innocence of the offense of conviction, i.e., that
petitioner did not commit the crime of which he was convicted; this standard is not
satisfied by a showing that a petitioner is legally, but not factually, innocent.”).
169. Id.
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errors at trial.170 Even if Jones had been sentenced under a career
offender provision, the only basis for his request to expand the
noncapital sentence exception would have been the conviction
vacated for factual innocence.
In sum, a petitioner seeking to expand the noncapital sentence
exception in the Fourth Circuit must base her request for habeas
review on factual innocence of one or more of the prior convictions
that formed the basis for her sentencing as a habitual or career
offender.171 The petitioner must show that she did not in fact commit
one of the crimes of which she was previously convicted; she will not
be able to rely on legal innocence to expand the exception.172
2. In the Interest of Justice: The Argument for Expanding the
Noncapital Sentence Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations
While there are significant facial differences between the
McQuiggin Court’s decision to expand the conviction innocence
exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations and any future decision
by the Fourth Circuit to permit the noncapital sentence exception to
do the same, the implications for fairness and justice that the two
scenarios present are practical equivalents. A petitioner who is
factually innocent of past crimes that formed the basis for his prison
sentence should have habeas review available to him beyond the
mere 365-day period permitted by AEDPA. Although allowing the
noncapital sentence exception to apply to AEDPA’s statute of
limitations might condone a lack of diligence in pursuing claims and
add to federal courts’ already substantial caseload,173 failing to expand
the exception allows individuals to be incarcerated on the basis of
crimes that they did not commit. The balance of the scales of justice,
Fourth Circuit precedent, and the purpose behind the innocence
exceptions weigh in favor of expanding the noncapital sentence
exception.
a.

Fourth Circuit Precedent

Allowing the noncapital sentence exception to override
AEDPA’s statute of limitations would be consistent with Fourth
Circuit precedent, which strikes a unique balance between liberal

170.
171.
172.
173.

Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4–5.
See Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 494.
Id.
See infra Section IV.B.
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application of the exception and complete refusal to recognize it.174
The Fourth Circuit is one of a handful of courts that has recognized
and adopted the exception, as well as placed conditions on its
application.175 Its decision to recognize the exception acknowledges
that the incarceration of an individual for a crime she did not commit,
whether it is the crime of conviction or a prior conviction, is simply
unjust.176
Moreover, the Jones majority’s claim that conviction and
noncapital sentence innocence implicate “varying degrees of
injustice”177 runs contrary to Fourth Circuit precedent. The Fourth
Circuit has long insisted that imprisonment of an innocent person is a
manifest injustice regardless of the type of innocence at issue.178
Recognizing that incarceration for a longer period of time than
warranted is as much an injustice as incarceration for any length of
time when none is warranted, the court has stated, “[t]hree years of a
man’s life is not a trifling thing.”179 Three years of life in prison for a
crime that the petitioner never committed and three years in prison
added to a deserved sentence on the basis of a crime that the
petitioner never committed are effectively the same—the end result is
simply three years unjustly spent in prison. This common result in
both conviction and noncapital sentence innocence cases lends strong
credence to allowing both doctrines to overcome AEDPA’s statute of
limitations.
b. The Purposes of Habeas Review and Fundamental Similarities
In addition to Fourth Circuit precedent, the stated purposes of
habeas review also weigh in favor of applying the noncapital sentence
174. As discussed supra Section I.B.3, the conditions that petitioners must meet before
invoking the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception make this court a prime
candidate for expansion of the exception.
175. See supra Section I.B.3.
176. See United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing the Supreme
Court’s expansion of the exception to the capital sentence context and applying the same
logic to noncapital cases, stating that “[e]xcept for the obvious difference in the severity of
the sentences, we see little difference between holding that a defendant can be innocent of
the acts required to enhance a sentence in a death case and applying a parallel rationale in
non-capital cases”).
177. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2014).
178. See, e.g., Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893 (recognizing the actual innocence of noncapital
sentence exception).
179. United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996). In Ford, the Fourth
Circuit vacated and remanded the appellant’s sentence to the district court with
instructions to impose a shorter sentence because the court had improperly calculated the
appellant’s prior conviction level, despite the fact that the appellant failed to object to this
error during sentencing. Id.
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exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Habeas review was
designed to thwart just the type of “unconstitutional loss of liberty”180
that the noncapital sentence exception prevents. After all, the central
concept of the exception is that it should “appl[y] where a petitioner
is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime of which he was convicted or the
penalty which was imposed.”181 Although noncapital sentence
innocence cases do not present facts in which the entirety of the
sentence is wrongfully imposed, and the consequences of the
improper sentence do not include death, it is contrary to our sense of
justice to incarcerate an innocent individual for even a day longer
than he deserves.182
While the Supreme Court has recognized the equivalent nature
of the conviction and sentence innocence exceptions only in the
context of the death penalty,183 it rings true for noncapital sentence
cases as well. Where a person is innocent of the prior convictions that
serve as the basis of her sentence, she is “actually innocent” of that
sentence. The same is true of a person who did not commit the
aggravating factors that led to the imposition of the death penalty: he
is “actually innocent” of his capital sentence.184 Although there is
certainly more finality inherent in the death penalty, the basic
principle remains the same. An individual should not be deprived of
his liberty for a longer period of time or in a more extreme way when
such an enhancement is unwarranted. To decide otherwise is an
injustice and a failure to preserve the constitutional protection against
unlawful incarceration guaranteed by the writ of habeas corpus.
Both the conviction and noncapital sentence innocence
exceptions serve the fundamental purpose of habeas review because
they attempt to rectify the same injustice: unconstitutional
incarceration. Although a petitioner claiming noncapital sentence
innocence is admittedly guilty of her crime of conviction, failure to
apply the exception allows her to be incarcerated for some period of
time on the basis of a crime she did not commit. This equivalent
injustice alone is reason for expanding the noncapital sentence
exception to instances in which petitioners who credibly claim factual
innocence seek habeas review after the statute of limitations has
expired. As in McQuiggin, these petitioners are potentially

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491–92 n.31 (1976).
Sawyer v. Whitley, 555 U.S. 333, 333 (1992) (emphasis added).
See id.
See id; see also supra Section I.B.
See United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994).
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incarcerated on an improper basis and should be entitled to review
regardless of when they file their claims.
c. Individual Obstacles and the Convoluted Habeas Review
Process
Another similarity between the conviction, capital sentence, and
noncapital sentence exceptions is that each distinct doctrine functions
within the same, complex system of habeas corpus. Sanctioning
different treatment of the statute of limitations period depending on
which exception a petitioner alleges is a failure to recognize the
practical, and often harsh, reality of the habeas system.185
Habeas petitioners must navigate a system of habeas review that
is often maligned as far too convoluted. “Habeas procedures have
come to resemble a maze of mirrors . . . .”186 Even trained attorneys
must be acutely aware of the various timetables governing habeas and
the intertwined statutory and judge-made intricacies of the
successiveness doctrine.187 Giving petitioners only one year in which
to file petitions for federal habeas review188 is already an arguably
unrealistic deadline.189
If the habeas system is deemed a complicated maze for
practitioners, consider petitioners who navigate the system pro se.190
Many startling statistics on the prevalence of mental illness, low IQ
scores, illiteracy, and below-average educational levels within the
state and federal prison populations191 suggest that pro se petitioners
185. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 492–93 n.31.
186. Michael A. Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of
the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 489–90 (1991).
187. See id.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). However, the one-year statute of limitations is
tolled while the petitioner pursues any state appellate or habeas review proceedings.
§ 2244(d)(2).
189. Congress itself has recognized that habeas corpus law has become increasingly
complex, for courts as well as for petitioners. H.R. REP. NO. 103-470, at 3 (1994) (“In
recent years, the practice and procedures in Federal habeas corpus have become
extremely complex—taking the resources of the Federal courts, delaying final adjudication
of petitioners’ claims, and creating friction with the State courts.”). For a more complete
discussion of the complicated and time consuming habeas process, see generally Mello &
Duffy, supra note 186. While this article addresses these topics in the context of a
previously proposed six-month time limit on state prisoners’ filing habeas petition claims
after obtaining counsel, its dialogue concerning the pitfalls of strict time limits on habeas
review is instructive for AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations as well.
190. Mello & Duffy, supra note 186, at 489–90 (“The doctrine can ‘operate as a trap for
the uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant.’ ”).
191. For instance, a 1982 study in Florida revealed that more than half of the state’s
inmates were “functionally illiterate.” Id. at 481. For a more complete discussion of the

94 N.C. L. REV. 991 (2016)

1024

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

face serious obstacles when seeking habeas review. As the Fourth
Circuit itself noted, “[c]ertainly a prisoner, unversed in the law and
the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance
than the trained lawyer in exploring his case.”192 AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations places these petitioners under an unreasonable
time crunch, especially given the complicated nature of habeas law
and the institutional barriers faced by so many inmates. Allowing
conviction innocence claims to overcome the statute of limitations
mitigates this problem, but refusing to do the same in sentence
innocence cases results in inequitable treatment of inmates who face
the same obstacles to asserting their constitutional rights.
In addition, it may be even more difficult for an inmate to
discover that he has a cause of action for noncapital sentence
innocence than it is for him to comprehend that conviction innocence
renders a sentence wrongful. The concept of being entirely innocent
of a crime is presumably easier to grasp than an understanding that
the law imposes enhanced sentences on those with prior convictions
and that innocence of a prior conviction could result in a reduced
sentence. In other words, innocence of a prior conviction requires a
degree of knowledge of the law and sentencing schemes, whereas
being entirely innocent of a crime of conviction gives rise to a sense of
injustice even absent knowledge of the legal system. A petitioner
without legal counsel may be unaware of and slower to understand
that there are options available to vacate prior convictions and then
seek habeas review, particularly within a one-year period.193 This level
of difficulty is only exacerbated if the petitioner is also dealing with
one of the common barriers, such as mental illness or illiteracy,
mentioned above. These petitioners, just like their wrongfully
convicted counterparts, should have access to a gateway through
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
Fourth Circuit precedent, the purposes of habeas review, the
fundamental similarities between conviction and sentence innocence
claims, and the institutional and individual obstacles to habeas review
weigh strongly in favor of allowing credible noncapital sentence

various mental, educational, and other institutional obstacles confronted by pro se
defendants, see id. at 481–88.
192. Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911
(finding that stringent restrictions on the amount of time prisoners could spend in the
prison library were within the bounds of providing prisoners with meaningful access to the
courts only if prisoners were given access to trained research assistants).
193. See id.
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innocence claims to be brought even after AEDPA’s statute of
limitations expires.
IV. CONTEMPLATING AND ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
While strong fairness and justice concerns weigh in favor of
creating an exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations on the basis
of noncapital sentence innocence, such an exception would
admittedly present practical and administrative challenges. Many of
these challenges can be minimized or eliminated by imposing
conditions on the exception’s application. The challenges that remain
are simply the unavoidable and warranted consequences of allowing
petitioners to access the judicial system to remedy their unjust
sentences. This Part addresses several concerns raised by opponents
to expanding the exception and then proposes solutions to mitigate
these concerns.
A. Undue Expansion of the Original Innocence Exception
The most significant argument against expanding the noncapital
sentence exception is that doing so overly broadens the scope of what
was intended to be a “ ‘narrow’ exception.”194 In numerous cases,
courts have emphasized that the innocence exception is only to be
applied when there is evidence of the petitioner’s innocence such that
no reasonable jury could have convicted her of the crime.195 While it is
true that expanding the noncapital sentence exception would be a
further expansion of the original conviction innocence exception, this
expansion is warranted on the basis of fairness and justice. Although
any expansion of the exception will make it available to a greater
number of petitioners, the exception can be construed narrowly and
imbued with requirements that are just as stringent as those imposed
on conviction innocence cases. Such a construction mitigates concerns
for the courts’ scarce resources and better preserves the original
intent of the innocence exception as a limited doctrine.

194. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992).
195. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013) (“The miscarriage of
justice exception, we underscore, applies to a severely confined category: cases in which
new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted [the petitioner].’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
329 (1995))); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (“A petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
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For example, the rule for the noncapital sentence exception
could include a prejudice requirement. This requirement could state
that, for the noncapital sentence exception to apply, there can be no
overlap in the relevant sentencing guidelines ranges: the sentence the
defendant improperly received and the range in which he should have
been sentenced. In other words, for the noncapital sentence exception
to be available, the appropriate sentence (without any improperly
included prior convictions) must be a length of time that is lower than
the minimum sentence available in the guidelines range in which the
petitioner was wrongfully sentenced.196
Such a requirement would keep petitioners like Jones from
accessing the exception. In Jones, the petitioner’s sentencing range,
taking into account his later-vacated crimes, was 360 months to life in
prison.197 Had the later-vacated crimes been left out of the sentencing
calculation, his sentencing range would have been either 292 to 405
months (if both prior convictions were omitted) or 324 to 405 months
(if only one prior conviction was omitted).198 Jones could have, in the
court’s discretion, been given the same 360-month sentence even if
one or both of his prior convictions were excluded from the
sentencing calculation. Under a prejudice rule, the fact that there was
a possibility for Jones to be sentenced to the incarceration period he
ultimately received would mean that he suffered no demonstrable
prejudice and would not be eligible for application of the noncapital
sentence exception. A prejudice requirement would, however,
remedy the sentences of prisoners like the petitioner in Maybeck.
There, had the court not erred by improperly sentencing the
petitioner as a career offender, his sentencing range would have been
bounded by a maximum sentence lower than the minimum sentence
in the career offender range in which he was improperly placed.199

196. Use Appendix I to follow along with this concrete example. A prejudice
requirement would allow a petitioner sentenced to forty-six to fifty-seven months based on
a criminal history category of IV and an offense level of nineteen to use the noncapital
sentence exception to achieve habeas review and resentencing if the removal of a prior
conviction of which he was factually innocent would reduce his criminal history category
to II and, thus, reduce his properly available sentencing range to thirty-three to forty-one
months. The exception would apply here because the high end of this reduced sentencing
range does not reach the low end of the original sentencing range.
197. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 2014).
198. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4.
199. Had the petitioner been properly sentenced, the maximum sentence in the
appropriate range would have been 165 months. With the sentencing court’s error of
classifying the petitioner as a career offender, the minimum sentence within the range was
168 months. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 894 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Setting a high evidentiary bar is another means of ensuring that
the noncapital sentence exception is not unduly expanded. In
conviction innocence cases, the Supreme Court requires the
petitioner to present clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable jury would have found her guilty had the newly discovered
evidence been presented at trial. Similarly, for the capital sentence
exception to apply, the petitioner must prove that no reasonable jury
could have found that he committed the aggravating factors that
resulted in the imposition of the death penalty.200 To satisfy this
proposed heightened evidentiary threshold, petitioners would likely
need to present some concrete evidence—more than simply a
statement or a single witness announcing the petitioner’s innocence.
DNA, other physical evidence, and evidence of vacaturs already
granted in the jurisdiction of conviction would likely satisfy this
standard. This heightened evidentiary standard is likely to reduce the
feared flood of litigation resulting from an expansion of the exception
to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
An additional way to condition application of the exception and
avoid its undue expansion is to limit the eligible petitioners to those
sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act as career
offenders.201 According to a U.S. Sentencing Commission report from
2012, of the 84,173 cases reported to the Commission in 2012, only
2232 involved defendants sentenced as career offenders.202 Allowing
only career offenders to use the noncapital sentence exception would
drastically reduce the number of petitioners able to use the exception
and the types of instances in which it could be invoked, keeping it
nearer its original scope. A petitioner limit is already embedded in
200. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 506 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (“We . . . hold that to show
‘actual innocence’ one must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law.”). Congress has also selected the clear and
convincing evidence standard as the evidentiary standard in the instances in which it has
codified a modified miscarriage of justice exception, as in the case of second or successive
petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
201. The Fourth Circuit has already presumably done just this, according to the
reasoning in Jones. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014); see also supra
Section I.C.3. Again, placing this limit on the type of improperly imposed sentences
eligible for review under the noncapital sentence exception beyond the statute of
limitations period is not an attempt at achieving perfect justice—such a proposal would
include no technical or procedural limits. Rather, this proposal is an attempt to suggest
plausible mechanisms for assuaging opponents’ concerns that expanding the noncapital
sentence exception would result in an unbearable flood of litigation.
202. Quick Facts: Career Offenders, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (2014), http://www
.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Career
_Offender_FY14.pdf [http://perma.cc/YB3Y-QSCB].
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Fourth Circuit precedent,203 making the circuit a particularly ideal
setting for expanding the exception in a manner that preserves its
original intent as an exception of limited application.204 Under this
scheme, only those petitioners sentenced as career offenders because
of one or more prior convictions of which they were factually
innocent would be eligible for application of the exception.205
B.

Administrability and Finality

In addition to concerns over expanding the exception beyond its
original purpose, there are potentially adverse administrative
implications arising from allowing the noncapital sentence exception
to bypass AEDPA’s statute of limitations. By widening the actual
innocence gateway, courts may open themselves up to a flood of
litigation. If there is effectively no statute of limitations on these
claims, then the court will be required to consider every habeas
petition brought on the basis of conviction or noncapital sentence
innocence, no matter how long the petitioner knew about the facts on
which the claim is based. After McQuiggin, some suggest that “each
time an untimely petitioner claims innocence—and how many
prisoners asking to be let out of jail do not?—the district court will be
obligated to expend limited judicial resources wading into the murky
merits of the petitioner’s innocence claim.”206 This would divert the
courts’ time, funds, and energy away from “primary disputes”207 and
toward adjudicating habeas petitions.
These administrative problems will, admittedly, be more
pronounced if the actual innocence gateway through AEDPA’s
statute of limitations is opened to noncapital sentence innocence
claims. Yet, this Comment argues that there is no higher use of our
justice system than to uphold the right to be free from
unconstitutional incarceration.208 There can be no better use of our
judicial resources, scarce though they are, than to ensure that
innocent persons are not deprived of their liberty, to correct unjust
misapplications of the law, and to promote public confidence in the
judiciary by acknowledging and righting past wrongs.209
203. Jones, 758 F.3d at 587 (finding that, because Jones “was not sentenced as a
habitual offender[,]” he could not take advantage of the noncapital sentence exception).
204. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494–95 (1999) (declining to
broaden Maybeck’s holding to apply the exception whenever a guideline is misapplied).
205. Id.
206. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1942 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (establishing the right of habeas review).
209. See United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996).
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At a more practical level, the cost to a court of holding a
resentencing hearing is less than “the annual cost to taxpayers of
keeping people in prison who should no longer be there.”210 While
maintaining prisoners in prison facilities during the resentencing
process certainly continues to impose a burden on the fisc,
presumably the resentencing process will be much shorter, at least in
most cases, than allowing the wrongfully sentenced prisoner to finish
out her sentence. Furthermore, there are means of protecting scarce
judicial resources other than refusing to expand the noncapital
sentence exception. For instance, a postconviction bargaining or
mediation process could be implemented. Such a process would allow
prisoners claiming conviction or sentence innocence to bring their
evidence to the Attorney General or District Attorney and engage in
a dialogue over whether the sentence should be reduced. There are
certainly instances in which both parties agree that the petitioner has
been wrongfully convicted or improperly sentenced;211 especially in
these cases, the parties could agree on a solution to the improperly
imposed enhancement and present the results of the negotiation
(presumably a reduced sentence) to the court for approval. Instances
of successful mediation would eliminate the need for courts to expend
resources hearing evidence, making findings, and rendering a
judgment. This may be a practically viable model today when
wrongful conviction watchdog groups and prosecutors have begun to
work toward a common goal of identifying and correcting wrongful
convictions.212
In addition to administrative concerns, expanding the noncapital
sentence exception could undermine finality. This consequence, too,
requires a balancing act—weighing the legitimacy that finality lends
the court system against the need to correct injustices like wrongful
conviction and unjust sentencing. As former Fourth Circuit Judge
Murnaghan wrote, “I do not believe that the state’s interest in finality
outweighs even one year of a man’s life[.]”213 While it is true that

210. Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1091 (11th Cir. 2013).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 497 (1999) (“All agree that,
without a doubt, Appellees do not qualify for the sentencing enhancement which they
received.”) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
212. For example, prosecutors’ offices in Los Angeles, Brooklyn, Dallas, Manhattan, and
Washington, D.C. have formed wrongful conviction units solely to investigate and remedy
wrongful convictions. Marisa Gerber, L.A. County D.A. Jackie Lacey to Unveil Details on
Wrongful-Conviction Unit, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/local/lanow/la-me-ln-conviction-integrity-unit-20150629-story.html [http://perma.cc/M9FEZ7TS].
213. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 497 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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finality is an ideal toward which the justice system should strive, it
provides no excuse for allowing an individual to be incarcerated for a
crime that she did not commit. And, in situations in which the
petitioner has been properly convicted (both of prior crimes and the
crime at issue) and accurately sentenced, finality will be unaffected by
an expansion of the noncapital sentence exception.
C.

Separation of Powers

As Justice Scalia recognized and criticized in McQuiggin,
creating, or in this case expanding, a judge-made exception to
overcome a legislatively created statute of limitations presents
separation of powers concerns.214 Until McQuiggin, judge-made
exceptions in habeas law had only been permitted to overcome judgemade bars—the court overruling the court itself.215 Using the
exception to undermine Congress’s actions could be viewed as the
judicial branch overstepping its bounds by undermining the stated
intent and effect of legislation.216 Although separation of powers is a
serious constitutional concern, the need for comity and unyielding
respect for the boundaries between the branches of federal
government must be balanced with other issues of grave
constitutional concern, such as the unconstitutional incarceration of
innocent individuals.217 The Court has stated that the appropriate
balance gives greater weight to individual liberty when there is an
unconstitutional taking of life or liberty through unjust
incarceration,218 indicating that a separation of powers objection
should yield in the face of a credible conviction or sentence innocence
claim. Furthermore, petitioning the legislature would likely be
ineffective in this particular context. The issue of wrongful
incarceration is unlikely to be at the forefront of broad public
concern, and those who are most detrimentally affected by the
problem—incarcerated felons with enhanced sentences based on their
214. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1937 (2013) (“Never before ha[s the Court]
applied the exception to circumvent a categorical statutory bar to relief.”) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1938 (stating that the “free-and-easy approach” of modifying judge-made
doctrines to overcome judge-made procedural bars at will “has no place where a statutory
bar to habeas relief is at issue”).
217. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (noting the importance of balancing
the acknowledged need for comity among the various branches of government with the
“individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case”).
218. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (insisting that, though important, the
emphasis on comity “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust
incarceration”).
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criminal history—are often disenfranchised and unable to vote for
legislators likely to raise the issue in Washington.219
Furthermore, Congress likely did not intend to abridge the
courts’ liberal treatment of innocence claims when it passed AEDPA
and its accompanying statute of limitations.220 The Supreme Court
and lower courts have applied the innocence exceptions after
AEDPA’s passage without Congress issuing corrective legislation.221
Some argue that Congress did address innocence in its codification of
the statute of limitations. They suggest that the statute of limitations
supplants the traditional innocence exceptions as created and applied
by courts.222 According to proponents of this argument, AEDPA does
not foreclose review based on innocence claims, but simply requires
that these claims be brought within one year of the time at which the
facts underlying those claims could reasonably have been
discovered.223
Yet, as Justice Ginsburg made clear in McQuiggin, the statute of
limitations is not specific to innocence claims.224 Section
2244(d)(1)(D) allows the statute of limitations period to begin
running on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.”225 There is no limitation on this provision that allows it
to apply only when a petitioner claims actual innocence.226
Additionally, the innocence exceptions do not contain a diligence
requirement, unlike § 2244.227 Rather than replacing the innocence
exceptions with § 2244’s modified, heightened, and less specific
standard, Congress likely intended for the innocence exceptions to
219. SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (Apr. 2014) (“[Forty-eight] states and the District of Colombia prohibit voting
while incarcerated for a felony offense.”).
220. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932 (“The miscarriage of justice exception, our
decisions bear out, survived AEDPA’s passage.”).
221. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (“The miscarriage of
justice standard is altogether consistent . . . with AEDPA’s central concern that the merits
of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of
factual innocence.”).
222. See, e.g., McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012) (explaining the moments at which AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations begins to run for various actual situations).
224. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932–33.
225. § 2244(d)(1).
226. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933 (explaining that the continued application of the
miscarriage of justice exception does not render § 2254(d)(1)(D) superfluous and
therefore violate accepted principles of statutory interpretation).
227. See id. (finding that § 2244(d)(1)(D) is “modestly more stringent [than the
miscarriage of justice exception] (because it requires diligence)”).
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have continued efficacy under appropriate factual circumstances.228
Courts have historically exercised substantial control over habeas law,
and this traditional equitable power can only be overcome by the
“clearest command” from Congress.229 While AEDPA may contain
alternative mechanisms and timelines governing habeas review, there
is no clear command that federal courts abandon the established
innocence exceptions.230 Thus, courts should continue to apply and
expand the exceptions as appropriate until Congress issues a clear
command to the contrary.
D. Jones’s Foreclosure of Applying McQuiggin in the Sentence
Innocence Context
Though the reasons for and means of responsibly extending
McQuiggin’s reasoning to the noncapital sentence exception abound,
the Fourth Circuit foreclosed this particular route of expansion
through its broad language in Jones.231 However, McQuiggin is not
the sole route to achieve the exception’s expansion. In particular,
United States v. Begay232 provides an alternate means of bypassing the
McQuiggin dead-end created by Jones. In Begay, the Supreme Court
redefined many crimes that had previously been classified as crimes
of violence as outside the definition of “crime of violence” under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender provision.233
The Seventh Circuit used Begay as the basis for postconviction
relief in the face of procedural bars to habeas review in Narvaez v.
United States.234 Applying Begay, the Seventh Circuit held that a
petitioner who was wrongfully sentenced as a career offender because
of the improper classification of one or more of his prior convictions
as crimes of violence could use the noncapital sentence exception to
overcome procedural bars to collateral review.235 Seventh Circuit
228. Id. at 1934.
229. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010).
230. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1934.
231. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 586 (4th Cir. 2014) (“At bottom, we conclude
that McQuiggin does not extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual innocence of his
sentence, rather than of his crime of conviction.”).
232. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
233. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008); see also UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
234. 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
235. For a thorough discussion of Narvaez and its application of Begay, see Greg
Siepel, The Wrong Kind of Innocence: Why United States v. Begay Warrants the Extension
of “Actual Innocence” to Include Erroneous, Noncapital Sentences, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
665 (2013). This article also addresses the virtues of using Begay to recognize the actual
innocence of noncapital sentence in circuits that have not yet done so. Id. at 696–99.
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petitioners whose sentences took into account prior crimes of
violence that were later deemed outside the scope of that category by
Begay can now seek habeas review using the noncapital sentence
exception without concern for untimeliness or successiveness.236
Although this rule is limited in a number of ways,237 its creation
“seems to suggest that serving an erroneously enhanced sentence is
equivalent to being punished for a non-existent crime.”238
While Narvaez is limited in scope to procedural bars, its
reasoning could be applied to AEDPA’s statute of limitations in a
particular set of factual situations. For those petitioners whose
sentences were rendered unlawful by Begay, the court could
recognize that their noncapital sentence innocence should allow them
to seek habeas review after the statute of limitations expires.
Otherwise, these prisoners will continue to serve “sentences that are
clearly erroneous” in light of Begay.239 While such a rule would not
aid petitioners whose sentences were not imposed under the crime of
violence rule,240 it would begin to reform a system that currently
leaves wrongfully sentenced inmates little recourse. Just as the
Seventh Circuit applied Begay in Narvaez, the Fourth Circuit could
use Begay to expand the noncapital sentence exception to the statute
of limitations in all instances where a habeas petitioner was
previously sentenced under the now void definition of “crime of
violence.” This is not a perfectly just or ideal solution because it
excludes petitioners who are innocent of prior convictions that were
not erroneously classified as crimes of violence under the ACCA. It
is, however, a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
Whether a person is incarcerated for a crime that she did not
commit, or is imprisoned for a longer period of time based on a crime
that she did not commit, the result is the same—she is wrongfully

236. See id. at 687–88.
237. For instance, the rule only applies to petitioners who were sentenced before the
Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which held that the
United States Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory. Hawkins v. United States, 706
F.3d 820, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2013). The rule also applies only to petitioners whose sentences
exceed the statutory maximum allowable in the proper range—the one in which they
would have been sentenced had one or more of their prior convictions not unlawfully been
taken into account. See Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 630.
238. See Siepel, supra note 235, at 687.
239. See id. at 700.
240. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
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sentenced and unconstitutionally incarcerated. In McQuiggin, the
Supreme Court recognized that AEDPA’s statute of limitations must
take a backseat when a petitioner presents a convincing claim of
conviction innocence. The same reasoning rings true in sentence
innocence claims: when a petitioner presents a convincing claim that
he is innocent of a prior conviction that formed the basis of his
sentence, he should be able to access the courts and pursue a proper
sentence. Although a perfectly just system would impose no
conditions on this access to relief from wrongfully imposed noncapital
sentences, limits like a prejudice requirement and a heightened
evidentiary standard could be imposed to assuage the concerns of
those who believe that expanding the exception will result in a
crippling flood of frivolous claims.241
Expanding the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s
statute of limitations will certainly entail increased litigation and
administrative obstacles. Yet,
[w]e cannot casually ignore [unjust incarceration] because of an
overly strict adherence to technical requirements. No court of
justice would require a man to serve . . . undeserved years in
prison when it knows that the sentence is improper. The
fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our judicial system
demand that we correct [these] sentence[s].242
We should abandon the illusion that there are varying degrees of
injustice when it comes to wrongfully imposed sentences. The Fourth
Circuit, with its pre-existing conditions on the noncapital sentence
exception, is a good place to start. The court has an opportunity to
continue its progressive trend of recognizing the basic commonality
between conviction innocence and sentence innocence claims. Doing
so would not only set a tone that could reverberate nationwide, but
would also achieve a just result for prisoners currently serving
wrongfully imposed sentences.

241. See supra Part IV.
242. United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996).
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